The U.K. skill premium fell from the 1950s to the late 1970s and then rose very sharply. This paper examines the contributions to these relative wage movements of international trade and technical change. We first measure trade as changes in product prices and technical change as TFP growth. Then we relate price and TFP changes to a set of underlying factors. Among a number of results, we find that changes in prices, not TFP, were the major force behind the rise in inequality in the 1980s. We also find that although increased trade pressure has raised technical change, its effect on wage inequality was not quantitatively significant.
Introduction
UK skilled wages relative to unskilled wages fell more or less continuously from the end of World War II to the late 1970s. Since then they have risen very sharply: the rise in the last twenty years has undone the fall over the previous thirty-five. This sharp rise has been associated with a range of issues that have risen to the top of the policy agenda: social exclusion, poverty and unemployment.
The leading demand-side causes for these trends, international trade and technical change, have been explored by a number of researchers (see Wood, 1998 , for a recent summary).
Most studies do not find support for the trade hypothesis. Desjonqueres, Machin, and Van Reenen (1997) and Neven and Wyplosz (1996) analyse changes in U.K. product prices across industries of different skill intensities. Contrary to the intuition of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, these studies find no evidence that relative prices for unskilled-intensive products fell during the 1980s. As for technology, Machin (1996) and Machin and van Reenen (1998) document the widespread occurrence of skill-biased technical change (SBTC) in a number of industries or establishments over a number of countries; they also show that most economywide skill-upgrading has occurred due to skill-upgrading within industries. This evidence suggests that SBTC may have contributed to the rising skill premium.
These studies are suggestive, but they face at least three important limitations. First, in the technology studies, the link between SBTC and relative wages is usually based on a onesector model, in which technical change must be factor-biased to affect relative wages. But in a multi-sector model the wage effects of technical change often depend on its sector bias, i.e., on what sectors enjoy the most technical progress, independent of any factor bias.
Furthermore, in a multi-sector model all kinds of technical change, factor-biased or factorneutral, can affect relative wages. No U.K. study has considered all kinds of technical change from this multi-sector perspective. 1
1 The importance of sector bias is a well-established result in the multi-sector literature, see below for more discussion. Its intuition can be seen from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which works via the sector bias of product-price changes altering Second, the product-price studies have been only loosely linked to the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) trade framework they commonly invoke. These studies regress changes in industry product prices on the industry skilled/unskilled employment ratio. This specification was used in many early HO studies of U.S. wages, but, as later studies showed and as we show below, it is misspecified relative to HO theory. These results are therefore difficult to interpret.
Third, all these studies assume that prices and technology are exogenous. In linking price changes with international trade, the price studies all assume, explicitly or implicitly, that domestic prices change due to trade forces. But, as Deardorff and Haikura (1994) and Freeman (1995) have argued, evidence is required as to how much domestic-price variation is caused by international trade, such as changes in trade barriers or changes in international product prices. 2 Similarly, one might reasonably ask what forces cause technical change. For example, Wood (1994) has conjectured that trade liberalisation induces technical change (in which case the trade/technology distinction might be inappropriate). Overall, knowing what underlying forces are driving prices and technology may be extremely important for understanding the consequence of policy, e.g., trade barriers or R&D incentives.
In this paper we address all these issues by using a single theoretical framework, the production side of HO trade theory, to explore the role of trade and technology in changing U.K. relative wages. The core of this framework is a set of zero-profit conditions linking domestic factor prices to product prices and technology in traded sectors where goods are produced domestically. These conditions help determine national factor demands and thus, when combined with factor supplies, equilibrium factor prices. Importantly, the effect on the relative profitability of sectors and so inducing wage changes to restore general equilibrium. Likewise it is the sector bias of technology changes that tends to alter sectoral profitability and so relative wages, a result dating back as far as Findlay and Grubert (1959) . Haskel and Slaughter (1998) set out a model explaining the roles of sector bias versus factor bias and analyse the sector bias of SBTC for the UK and other countries. SBTC is of course only one type of technical change that can change sectoral profits. 2 Freeman (1995, p. 29) writes: "Perhaps the biggest problem with these studies is that they ignore potential determinants of changes in sectoral prices and potential reasons for the proportion of unskilled workers in a sector to be correlated with changes in prices, save for trade." Using an approach different from this paper, Harrigan and Balaban (1997) instrument for U.S. tradables prices using foreign labour endowments and trade flows.
wages of changes in product prices and technology tends to depend on the sector bias of these changes. The reason is that any price or technology change which initially increases profits in a particular sector tends to raise the economy-wide wage for factor(s) employed relatively intensively in that sector until zero profits are restored in all sectors.
This theory implies an empirical specification in which a cross-section of changes in sector product prices or total-factor productivity (TFP) are regressed on sector cost shares for various factors of production. We interpret the coefficient estimates on the cost shares as the economy-wide wage changes "mandated" by the sector bias of changes in prices or TFP, i.e., wage changes which maintain zero profits in all sectors following changes in prices or technology. Estimates of these mandated wage changes can then be compared with actual wage changes to see what share of actual changes can be accounted for by various trade and technology forces.
To address the question of whether prices and technology are endogenous, we estimate two sets of mandated-wage regressions based on two different sets of assumptions. First, as a benchmark, we assume that the United Kingdom is a small, open economy, implying that changes in domestic prices are entirely due to international trade, and that TFP growth is exogenous. Here, we simply use price changes or TFP growth in the mandated-wage regressions to estimate trade and technology's wage effects.
Second, we assume that sector price changes and TFP growth are each caused by a set of underlying forces. We model U.K. prices as depending on U.K. import prices from various country groups, and TFP as depending on technology and on product and labour market competition. In a first stage, we can calculate the contribution of each underlying force to changes in prices or TFP. In a second stage, we regress each of these contributions on sector factor-cost shares. The second-stage coefficients we interpret as wage changes mandated by the sector bias of underlying forces working through changes product prices or TFP growth.
Among a number of results, we find that changes in prices, not TFP, were the major force behind the rise in inequality in the 1980s. We are the first study to find significant price effects on UK wage inequality. 3 We also find that although increased pressure of trade has affected technology, its effect on wage inequality was not statistically significant.
We believe that this paper makes a number of contributions to the literature on U.K. wage inequality. First, our work addresses all three concerns raised above in a unified framework.
Second, we obtain quantitative estimates of trade and technology's wage impacts rather than just qualitative evidence. 4 Third, our study is the first to apply the mandated-wage methodology to the U.K. case-in fact, the first we are aware of to apply it to a country other than the United States. Fourth, most U.K. studies focus on the 1980s; we analyse the 1960s and 1970s as well.
In addition to these contributions to existing research on the U.K. experience, we think our study also contributes to the recent mandated-wage literature (see Slaughter (1999) for a survey). Only one other study has used the two-stage procedure. Feenstra and Hanson (1998) decompose the sum of US price changes and TFP into components attributable to computer usage and to imported intermediate inputs. We make three contributions to this two-stage approach. First, we are the first mandated-wage study to relate domestic prices to import prices. Second, our TFP decomposition uses a broader set of structural forces suggested by the large industrial-organisation literature on causes of TFP. Third, we are the first mandatedwage study to consider empirically whether import competition induces technical change. 5 The next section of the paper sets out our mandated wage framework. In section 3 we describe the data. Section 4 presents our empirical work, and section 5 concludes.
3 Whilst this paper was being completed were we made aware of Gregory and Zissimos (1998) that uses the mandated wage method for the 1980s. Using input/output data and different skill divisions they also find significant price effects. They do not use a two-stage procedure as we do, nor do they provide evidence for earlier decades. 4 For example, the finding that SBTC has been widespread does not indicate what share of overall inequality changes SBTC accounts for. 5 Our findings are consistent with a large literature explaining U.K. TFP. For the role of unions see Metcalf (1989) and Gregg, Machin and Metcalf (1993) ; for product-market competition see Haskel (1991) and Nickell (1996) ). See Lawrence (1999) for an empirical analysis of U.S. TFP growth and foreign competition.
Mandated-Wage Methodology
Most researchers have analysed U.K. wage inequality in a supply-and-demand framework.
In deriving economy-wide labour demand, almost all U.K. studies have assumed a one-sector economy. In this case, firm-level relative labour demand aggregates straightforwardly, so that national relative demand slopes downward in (relative quantity, relative wage) space.
We, too, use a supply-and-demand framework. The key feature of our analysis, however, is we assume there are many sectors, not just one. Many fundamental ideas in trade theory require multiple sectors, e.g., comparative advantage. In addition, empirical work on SBTC has documented its pervasiveness across many disaggregated sectors (e.g., Berman, Bound, and Griliches, 1994) . It therefore seems appropriate to use a multi-sector model. 6 Why do multiple sectors matter? Consider an increase in skilled-labour supply to the economy. In a one-sector model, the economy can absorb the extra skilled labour only through wage changes. But in a multi-sector model, sectoral outputs can change as well. A combination of higher output in the skill-intensive sector and lower output in the unskilledintensive sector can potentially absorb the rise in skilled supply (a Rybczynski effect).
Therefore, the economy-wide labour-demand curve, in a multi-sector model, reflects both these output mix changes and relative wage changes.
2a. Economy-Wide Relative Labour Demand in the HO Model
To derive the economy-wide relative labour demand schedule we need to explain how relative labour-supply changes can be absorbed by changing output mixes. To do this, consider a country endowed with J distinct primary factors of production. The country freely trades with the rest of the world but has no influence on product prices. Suppose there are a large number, S, of tradable output sectors in the world. The domestic decentralised optimisation of all profit-maximising firms is equivalent to the country "choosing" the 6 We do not suggest, of course, that one-sector models are always inappropriate. But it is always acknowledged that compositional effects may be important in one sector/representative agent models. Here composition effects are key. national output mix that maximises GNP subject to the constraints of world product prices, national factor supplies, and national production technology (see, e.g., Dixit and Norman, 1980) . This optimal output mix consists of both which sectors are produced and production quantities.
Let this decentralised process result in I different tradable goods that the country optimally produces, each of which requires some combination of J primary factors and I intermediate inputs. 7 Then in each of the I sectors, perfect competition ensures zero profits, i.e., average cost equals price. For each sector i, we write zero-profit condition are optimally chosen by profit-maximising firms and so depend on production technology and (assuming substitutability in production) wages and prices.
The I zero-profit conditions in (1) link domestic factor prices to product prices and technology in all traded sectors with positive domestic production. As national factor supplies vary, so might the set of I products produced and thus the set of I zero-profit conditions in (1).
This suggests a way to derive national factor-demand schedules: vary factor supplies, and use these endowments plus the zero-profit conditions to trace out the labour demand curve.
7 We omit imported intermediate inputs for notational simplicity.
To make this derivation concrete, Figure 1 graphs the national relative factor demand schedule for the case of two factors, skilled and unskilled labour, and three sectors: an unskilled-labour-intensive good, a "middle" factor-intensity good, and a skilled-labourintensive good (see also Leamer, 1998 and Wood, 1995 for a similar diagram). Notes: Skilled labour is subscripted "s" and unskilled labour "u".
Consider the leftmost downward-sloping branch, where the relative supply of skilled labour is very low. Given this endowment, the country maximises GNP by producing only one product, the unskilled-labour-intensive good. A relatively high quantity of unskilled labour is demanded and since skilled labour is relatively scarce, it earns a high relative wage. supply wages do not change, so long as the country continues to make these two products.
This insensitivity of national wages to national factor supplies Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) call the factor price insensitivity (FPI) theorem. 9
8 With Leontief technology the a ji 's are constants. With substitutability, they depend on relative wages as well. The algebra is more involved, but the results still stands: the two wages are determined by the two output prices and technology parameters. 9 Note that FPI assumes that the country is sufficiently small that changes in its relative-output mix do not change world product prices. If world prices do change than so, too, do domestic wages. Below we discuss such price changes; for now, note that a change in prices changes (1") and thus wages.
The remaining portions of RD follow the same intuition. Beyond the first perfectly-elastic portion the country switches to producing just the middle good; on the next perfectly-elastic portion it produces both that good and the skill-intensive good; and on the last downwardsloping branch it produces just the skill-intensive good. Note that because a different set of products is made on each elastic part, each has different relative wages.
Our derivation of Figure Thus in Figure 1 , the infinitely-elastic parts of RD are where J≤I while the downward-sloping parts are where I<J. 10 Given this intuition for the shape of RD, it is important to emphasise that its position depends on product prices and production technology. Hence, changes in prices or technology shift the position of the relevant parts of RD, and given labour supplies, wages change to restore zero profits in all sectors.
To see the adjustment process formally, assume that over some time period an economy produces the same set of I>J goods and therefore remains on a flat portion of RD. Totally differentiating the I zero profit conditions in (1) with respect to time gives (Leamer, 1998) 11
] is the change in value added prices 12 , V jit is the share of factor j in total costs in sector i at time t; and ∆logTFP it is the growth in total-factor productivity for sector i. The final term in (2), ∆logw jt , is the change in the wage of factor j, which is of course economy-wide since all factors are mobile across sectors.
Equation (2) shows how ∆logw jt responds to any changes in prices (∆logp it ) or in technology (∆logTFP it ) to restore zero profits in all sectors. At initial factor prices, any change in product prices or technology means zero profits no longer hold in one or more sectors. Hence producers try to expand output in now-profitable sectors and reduce output in unprofitable sectors. Relative labour demand increases for the factors employed relatively intensively in expanding sectors and reduces for the factors intensive in the contracting sectors. To restore equilibrium, at fixed labour supply, relative wages must adjust in response to the demand shifts until all profit opportunities are arbitraged away.
The key empirical implication of (2) is that the wage effects of changes in product prices and technology tend to depend on their sector bias. Any change which initially increases profits in a particular sector tends to raise the economy-wide wage for factor(s) employed relatively intensively in that sector. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem describes how wages tend to rise for factors employed intensively in sectors enjoying rising relative product prices.
The same intuition applies to technology: wages tend to rise for factors employed intensively in sectors enjoying relatively large technology gains. 13 In terms of figure 1, RD shifts up when price and/or TFP growth is concentrated in skillintensive sectors. RD shifts down when this growth is concentrated in unskilled-intensive sectors. Assuming the economy remains on a flat portion of RD, (2) allows us to quantify these wage effects of shifts in RD induced by sector-biased changes in prices and technology. 14 Equation (2) links technical change, prices and relative wages. To use it further, we must make some additional assumptions regarding exogeneity. First, suppose that the UK is a small open economy, i.e. changes in domestic prices are entirely due to international trade, and suppose too that TFP growth is exogenous. In (2), we can use data on prices and outputs and inputs to construct ∆logp it , ∆logTFP it and V jit . The term ∆logw jt , which is the change in the economy-wide factor price required to maintain zero profits, is of course unknown. To determine technology's effect on wages we estimate
where ε it is an additive error term and the J coefficients β jt are parameters to be estimated. A positive β jt indicates that technical change was larger in sectors in which factor j constitutes a larger share of costs, i.e., in sectors which employ factor j relatively intensively. Our sectorbias intuition suggests that the national wage for factor j should have risen in response to these price changes. Hence, we interpret each β jt as factor j's wage change "mandated" to restore zero profits in all sectors in response to the sector bias of technical change. We can then compare our mandated wage changes with actual wage changes to determine what share of actual changes are accounted for by technology.
For trade we estimate a similar equation given by 14 If the economy produces a range of goods such that it is on the downward sloping portion of RD, the zero profit conditions in (2) still hold. But (2) would not fully determine wage changes since factor supplies matter as well. It would clearly be of relevance to know the width of the flat and downward-sloping parts of the RD curve and the details of the change in goods produced. Theory predicts that switching product mixes (i.e. dropping production of unskilled-intensive goods and undertaking production of skilled-intensive goods) as the economy moves from a flat section to a downwardsloping section of RD depends on the interaction production technologies, world product prices and domestic endowments. Empirically, there is very little empirical evidence on changes in product mix over countries or time.
where ε it is an additive error term. Each estimate γ jt is the zero-profit-restoring change in factor j's wage "mandated" by the sector bias of price changes. We also can compare mandated changes to actual wage changes to see what share of actual changes technology accounts for. Finally, adding together the βs and γs from (3) and (4) 
where S pr and S te are the two sets of underlying variables and each parameter in the vectors δ te and δ pr gives the contribution of its affiliated structural variable to observed TFP and price variation, respectively.
15 Three further points on (3) and (4) are worth noting. First, the error term in each equation captures, for example, zero profits not holding exactly in all sectors. Second, note that with our small-economy assumption TFP growth can affect factor prices but not product prices. Third, our mandated-wage regressions might appear odd because the exogenous variable is the regressand rather than the regressor while the dependent variable of interest (factor-price changes) is estimated rather than the regressand. The most important reason a "standard" regression cannot be used is the dimensionality of the data prevents inversion of the (J x I) regressor matrix formed by stacking all I industries in equations (3) or (4). For example, our data used below contain over 100 manufacturing industries but only three primary factors plus intermediate inputs. With more products than factors the regressor matrix is not square and thus cannot be inverted.
In the second stage we regress the predicted values due to each underlying variable on the factor cost shares:
The share coefficients (β jt, te and γ jt, pr ) give the wage changes mandated by the sector bias of each structural force working through either TFP or prices. For example, if the first-stage equation (5) indicates that increased trade contributes to ∆logTFP it then second-stage equation (7) tells how much trade has affected wages through its induced sector bias of changes in TFP.
In sum, we estimate the wage effects of trade and technology under two different assumptions. First we assume prices and technology are exogenous and estimate (3) and (4).
Second, we assume prices and technology are endogenous and estimate (5)-(8).
Before finishing the discussion of our HO framework, we contrast our single-stage price regression (4) with the U.K. price regressions, cited in the introduction, which are of the form
where (S/U) i is the skilled/unskilled employment ratio in industry i during the starting period.
Equation (9) is estimated with reference to HO trade theory, as in many of the initial productprice studies for the U.S. But (9) does not follow from the HO model as closely as (6) does, so these earlier findings may not be as informative (see Slaughter, 1999) .
2b. Other Issues Concerning the HO Model
To address some possible criticisms of the HO model, we note the following. First, it its important to stress the role of factor supplies. FPI does not imply that wages are invariant to factor supplies. As explained earlier, national factor supplies do help determine wage levels in at least two cases. First, when the country chooses a national output mix with fewer produced goods than factors and second, even if FPI initially holds, when labour-supply shocks induce the country to make a different set of products. In our data analysis, for each decade we assume both that FPI holds and that the U.K. product mix did not change. In the absence of information on changes in product mix, every previous mandated-wage study has made these same assumptions. In terms of Figure 1 , they mean that we estimate trade and technologydriven shifts up or down for a single flat portion of RD. If our assumptions are correct, then our mandated wage changes should match actual wage changes. If the two do not match, one possible reason will be that endowment changes moved the economy to a new part of RD.
We return to this issue in Section 4.
A second issue is the role of SBTC. In (2), ∆logTFP it embodies all kinds of technical change, including SBTC. 16 We consider all types of technical change, since any type of technical progress increases sectoral profitability and thus induces wage changes.
Third, the factor price equalisation (FPE) theorem (Samuelson, 1948) predicts that each factor receives the same wage world-wide. It is important to stress we do not assume FPE or impose it at any stage. Our framework considers the production side of a single country. FPE requires at least one other country and restrictive assumptions about cross-country similarities (such as identical production technologies) which we do not impose in any way. Our framework allows FPI, but this is a much less restrictive condition than FPE.
16 To see that ∆lnTFP growth embodies all types of technical progress, suppose Y=A×F(αS, βU) where Y is output, S skilled labour, U unskilled labour, A is Hicks-Neutral TC, α is skill-biased TC and β is unskilled biased TC. Taking logs and differentiating with respect to time gives, where ∆x denotes change in log x over time, ∆lnTFP≡∆y-V s ∆S-V u ∆U=∆a+V s ∆α+V u ∆β where V s and V u are cost shares in output and we have used the first-order conditions for S and U.
The fourth point concerns interindustry wage differentials. Our model assumes perfect interindustry factor mobility such that each factor earns the same wage in all sectors. A large literature has documented sizeable interindustry wage differentials for workers with the same measurable skills (see e.g. Katz and Summers, 1989 As the table shows, changes in inter-industry wage differentials account for at most 11% of total industry wage changes. This is consistent with the evidence in Katz and Summers (1989) and others that wage differentials are very stable over time. Interindustry wage differentials clearly exist in levels, but changes in industry wages are driven almost entirely by changes in economy-wide wages. Thus, we think that our mandated-wage analysis is of considerable relevance (algebraically, wage differentials might be fixed effects in (1) that disappear in (2)). Fifth, a related issue is imperfectly competitive product markets. For sector bias to drive relative wages we only require a systematic link from prices and technology to wages. Perfect competition delivers this link, but an alternative would be imperfect competition with a constant price-cost mark-up. Like wage differentials, this would change (1) but not (2): some constant extranormal profit would be added to (1) (which might contribute to wage differentials), but this would disappear in (2). Even with imperfect competition, monopolistic competition with entry would give zero equilibrium profits (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) .
Sixth, a nontraded sector can easily be incorporated into our framework. If the number of tradable goods at least equals the number of primary factors, national wages are still determined by the zero-profit conditions of the tradable sectors only. This means that nontraded industries need not be included in the estimation. Nontradables' product prices are endogenously determined by production technology in the nontraded sector and by wages.
Technical progress in nontradables does not affect wages; instead, it lowers nontraded prices.
Finally, our model does not have labour-market institutions, such as unions or centralised wage setting, which might influence wages. Empirically we do consider unions, but through their effect on TFP growth. Constructing an estimable general equilibrium model incorporating these wage setting institutions is beyond the scope of this current paper. 18
Data, Measurement and Econometrics
Here we discuss the essential features of the data; details are given in an appendix. Our main data are the U.K. manufacturing data collected by Oulton and O'Mahony (OO, 1994) . 19 OO constructed an industry-year panel, based mainly on the Census of Production, for around 18 For (partial equilibrium) evidence that unions do not seem very important in explaining U.K. wage inequality see Gosling and Machin (1996) . It is worth contrasting the role of unionisation here to that usually considered in the literature. Unions are generally seen as narrowing wage inequality for (not well understood) institutional reasons or via unobserved sorting. Our framework measures instead the contribution of unions to wage inequality via technical change. For example, if unions hold up technical change disproportionately in the skill-intensive sectors then they raise the relative profitability of the unskill-intensive sectors. This tends to lower wage inequality. A reduction of union power could therefore raise wage inequality by increasing TFP growth in the skill-intensive sectors. 19 We are extremely grateful to Nicholas Oulton for providing us with these data and some unpublished data consistent with published data.
135 three-digit U.K. SIC manufacturing industries at roughly five-year intervals. 20 This panel contains information on prices and quantities of output, labour, capital and intermediates.
The labour data are divided into manual and non-manual employees, whom we call unskilled and skilled workers, respectively. Our measure of wage inequality is thus the nonmanual/manual wage premium in U.K. manufacturing. This occupational measure is the only skills measure consistently available (a) over a long time period (b) with congruent trade and technology indicators, and (c) at a disaggregated level. On average, non-manuals are more educated than manuals (see Machin (1996) and Haskel and Heden (1998) ), so these occupation data do distinguish skill groups. 21 Table 2 shows the fall and then rise of the U.K.
skill premium. In addition the 1980s rise, the earlier fall also requires explanation. 20 We dropped shipbuilding, vehicles, iron and steel and aerospace since they were (wholly or partly) publicly owned during at least part of the sample period. Our results were robust to their inclusion. We lose a few industries in each decade due to missing observations. 21 Gregory and Zissimos (1998) obtain very similar results to us for the 1980s using a different data set with skill defined by education levels.
We calculated ∆logTFP it using our three primary factors (both labour types and capital) and intermediate inputs. 22 We calculated ∆logp it , changes in value-added prices, as defined earlier. Both ∆logTFP it and ∆logp it measure decade changes, with endpoints dictated by data availability. 23 . Following Feenstra and Hanson (1998), cost shares in gross output, V jit, are averages between the first and last years of each decade. We assumed that payments to capital equal the value of gross output less the total wage bill and input costs; we do not think we have good enough data to define capital's payments independently. Table 3a sets out summary statistics for all these variables. 1958-68, 1968-79, and 1979-86 . TFP is calculated using manufacturing-wide wages. See data appendix for details.
Source: Author's calculations from OO data.
22 In the productivity literature, errors in measuring ∆logTFP it are a major concern. We note that the OO data also contain a TFP series constructed using labour and capital disaggregated much more finely; the sample correlation between the two TFP measures was 0.95. We also note that in our analysis ∆logTFP it is used as a regressand, not a regressor, so we do not face the problem of estimation bias due to measurement error. 23 The 1960s change is 1958-68, the 1970s is 1968-79 and the 1980s is 1979-86. Table 3a shows the absolute wage changes underlying the inequality changes in Table 2 .
During the high-inflation 1970s wage and price growth were higher while TFP growth was slower; in addition, the standard deviation of price and TFP growth was larger. Capital's average cost share remains roughly constant while the unskilled share falls. There is little change in the standard deviation of any of the shares.
With three factors, in our one-stage analysis the estimating equation for technology is
and for prices is
where we estimate (3′) and (4′) separately for each decade.
Turning to the two stage approach, our selection of the determinants of ∆logTFP it follows the extensive U.K. productivity literature which stresses the role of financial, labour, and product markets (e.g., Haskel (1991) , Metcalf (1989), and Nickell (1996) ). Unfortunately we do not have satisfactory industry-year financial-market data. For labour markets we use industry union density, (denoted UNION gt where g denotes that the variable is available at two-digit level 24 ), and its decade change (∆UNION gt ). In standard effort bargain models ∆UNION gt reduces ∆logTFP it , but raises it in "voice" models. UNION gt (in levels) might also affect ∆logTFP it through incentives to learn or to introduce new work practices. Our productmarket regressor is the share of domestic sales (less imports) accounted for by the five largest firms, CONC it , available at the three-digit level.
24 Unfortunately the only data available over a cross-section and time series is a two-digit measure, but we did enter a threedigit cross-sectional measure of union coverage in 1973 as a partial check and get similar results to the levels data.
Beyond these commonly used determinants of ∆logTFP it , we consider three others as well. 
26
25 These survey data might be regarded as subjective and/or an incorrect measure of the total number of innovations by industry. For our purposes, however, we need only that these data capture the cross-sectional variation in technical propensity, e.g., how much more innovative the computer sector is than timber. 26 We are very grateful to Bob Anderton for providing us with these data. (6′)
where we again pool over the cross-sections 1973-79 and 1979-86 and add a time dummy and fixed effects. In the second stage, as in (8), we take the fitted values of each regressor from (6′) and regress them on cost shares separately for 1973-79 and 1979-86. 27 Concerning the estimation of (3′)-(6′) the following points are worth noting. First, we prefer ten-year differences to five-year differences (which we could construct) because the decade end points generally correspond with turning points in the skill premium. In addition, these endpoints were at roughly similar points in the business cycle, so cost shares should not be too contaminated by labour hoarding. Second, we estimated all our equations by WLS (the panel regressions (5′) and (6′) used LSDV) with sector employment averaged over the decade as weights (unweighted results were very similar). Since the cost shares appear as regressors and are also in ∆logTFP it , we re-estimated (3′) and (4′) and the second stage of (5′) and (6′) using IV with 1958 cost shares as instruments; we obtained almost identical results. Finally, in (7) and (8) the regressands are generated regressors from (5′) and (6′), and so we correct our coefficient standard errors in (7) and (8) using the method in Feenstra and Hanson (1998). Table 4 reports estimates of (9). Notes: Each column reports estimation of equation (9) for a different decade. For precise years, see Table 3 . Equations weighted by average-period employment. Absolute t statistics in parentheses.
Empirical Results

4a. Simple Price Regressions
These regressions suggest that in the 1960s relative prices rose for the unskilled-intensive sectors. This would tend to lower wage inequality, as indeed happened. There is no clear shift in relative prices during the 1970s. In the 1980s price rises were concentrated in the skill-intensive sectors. This would tend to raise inequality, as indeed happened. Our 1980s results are qualitatively similar to Neven and Wyplosz (1996) , who find a positive yet insignificant relationship (using gross-output prices). Desjonqueres, et al, (1997) find no significant relation for a sample of 16 sectors. Overall, Table 4 suggests that price changes played a significant role in wage changes during the 1960s and 1980s but not during the 1970s. To quantify the link from prices to wages, however, our mandated-wage analysis is required. Table 5 reports results for equations (3′) and (4′). Notes: Each column reports estimation results for a specification of either equation (3′) or (4′). Absolute t statistics in parentheses. Mandated inequality changes add the coefficients on Vsi and Vui in each column. The p value for each mandated change shows the probability of accepting the hypothesis that the coefficient on Vsi equals the coefficient on Vui.
4b. One-Stage Mandated-Wage Regressions
To read this table consider the first column which reports coefficient estimates for the regressors V si , V ui , and V ki from (4′) for 1958-68. The coefficient on V si , -0.20, indicates that the sector bias of 1960's price changes mandated a fall in the skilled wage of 20% to maintain zero profits in all sectors. Similarly, the mandated change in the unskilled wage was a rise of 27% and for capital a rise of 7%. Below these coefficient estimates we report the mandated change in the skill premium, -47% (equal to -0.20 -0.27), and its p value (0.20) indicating rejection of the null of zero mandated change in inequality at only the 80% significance.
Looking over all decades, the sector bias of price changes mandated an insignificant decline in inequality during the 1960s, an insignificant rise in inequality during the 1970s, and a significant rise in inequality during the 1980s. The 1980s results are the strongest in terms of significance. We regard these 1980s results to be particularly important: this is the first paper in the U.K. literature to find significant price effects during the 1980s (Gregory and Zissimoss, 1998 find a similar result). Turning to the technology regressions, the sector bias of TFP growth mandated a significant rise in inequality during the 1960s, a further insignificant rise during the 1970s, and an insignificant decline in inequality during the 1980s.
This suggests that technology, measured as TFP growth, did not contribute to wage inequality in the 1980s.
These results for prices and TFP individually are of interest, but we also want to know their combined wage effects. By comparing the combined "mandated" wage changes with actual changes, we can gauge how well our HO framework performs. Table 6 presents the net mandated wage changes and the actual wage changes. Looking at the top left-hand cell, the 1960s net mandated wage increase was 98% for skilled labour (this equals -20% + 118% from Table 5) , with a 95% confidence interval of Column (1) of Table 7 reports the estimation of (5′) using just the labour and product-market variables. All four regressors are significant and have signs consistent with previous work. In column (2) we add the three import-price regressors. The basic regressors are still significant, but only falls in relative NIC import prices significantly raise ∆logTFP it . Column (3) includes only relative NIC import and finds the same effect as in column (2). Finally, in column (4) we add computerisation but find an insignificantly positive link with ∆logTFP it . Table 8 reports the stage-two estimation results for equation (7) for each of the determinants of ∆logTFP it in Table 7 . Note: Each column reports estimation results for a specification of equation (7) using a different underlying variable multiplied by its coefficient estimate from Table 7 . Number of observations are 1973-79=117, 1979-86=121. Number in brackets under V s and V u estimates are absolute t statistics corrected for generated regressors, see text. NA denotes cannot calculate standard error due to the generated regressors procedure. Numbers in brackets in final row are absolute t statistics for hypothesis that the rise in inequality is zero. V k not reported for brevity.
For each underlying variable in each decade we report the mandated change in skilled wages, unskilled wages, and inequality. There are three significant results from Table 8 . First, innovations mandated significant rises in inequality over both decades. The intuition is that in both decades the positive effect of innovations on ∆logTFP it was concentrated in skillintensive sectors and hence innovations raised inequality. Second, changes in unionisation mandated a significant rise in inequality during the 1980s. The intuition is that the fall in unionisation during the 1980s was concentrated in skill-intensive sectors. This raised ∆logTFP it in these sectors (from Table 7 ) and so raised inequality. Third, ∆log(p UK /p NIC ) mandated a significant rise in inequality during the 1970s but no significant change during the 1980s. This is somewhat mixed support for the hypothesis that trade-induced TFP growth has raised inequality. Beyond these main results, our other forces had insignificant effects on inequality.
Two other points are worth noting. First, although Table 8 indicates that the sector bias of innovations' effect on ∆logTFP it significantly raised inequality during the 1970s and 1980s, Table 5 indicates for these decades that overall ∆logTFP it had no significant effect on inequality. These results suggest that other determinants of ∆logTFP it outweighed the sector bias of innovations. Second, our results can help think about the consequences of government policy. Policies which influence the determinants of ∆logTFP it can contribute to wage changes, e.g., legislation that reduces union power or R&D subsidies which increase innovations. Policies aimed at reducing inequality might need to consider its sectoral effects.
Turning to the price regressions, Table 9 reports stage-one estimates of (6′). Column (1) reports results using all three import-price regressors. As in Table 7 , only the NIC import prices have a significant effect: NIC import-price changes are significantly correlated with changes in ∆logp it . Column (2) omits the other prices and finds the same effect. This table is structured like Table 8 , and its message is that the sector bias of import-price changes working through ∆logp it mandated a significant decline in inequality during the 1970s but an insignificant rise during the 1980s. Thus, we find some evidence for the 1970s that "trade mattered" through the sector-bias of import-price pressures on domestic prices, but not for the key decade of the 1980s.
4d. Robustness Checks and Discussion of Empirical Results
We carried out a number of robustness checks on the results. First, to explore the role of technical change in inducing price changes, we added ∆logTFP it as a regressor in the stageone price regression (6′) and calculated its implied sector bias in the second stage. Although it was highly significant in explaining prices (coefficient =-.60, t =-11.50) it mandated an insignificant rise in wage inequality in both decades (t=0.27 for the 1970s and 1.55 for the 1980s). This suggests that ∆logTFP it did not have significant effects on wage inequality through price changes.
Second, since our data end in 1986 we re-examined the 1980s using a different Censusbased data set covering 1980-89 at the three-digit SIC level. 28 We also note that our 1980s results are extremely similar to Gregory and Zissimoss (1998) . They estimate mandated wage equations for 1979-90 using input-output tables to construct sectors and educational categories to define skills. Like us, they also find that technical change mandated no significant increase in inequality whilst price changes mandated a significant rise. This suggests that our results are robust to our non-manual/manual skills measure. Haskel and Slaughter (1998) we have a much coarser measure than they do. Leamer (1998) , reports that U.S. TFP growth mandated rising inequality during the 1960s, 1970s and (less strongly) the 1980s, while price changes mandated rising inequality during the 1970s.
Finally, we should mention that the only regressors in our ∆logp it regressions were foreign prices, time dummies and fixed effects. The low R 2 in these regressions suggests they by no means completely explain domestic prices. In future work, we hope to include other traderelated forces such as changes trade barriers.
Conclusions
We have attempted to estimate the effects of trade and technology on U.K. wage inequality.
To meet the problems in the existing literature we have proposed and implemented a method that (a) calculates the sector bias of prices and technical change, and (b) calculates the parts of prices and technical change due to foreign competition and/or other forces and the contribution of each of these forces to wage inequality.
Our method is based on the production side of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. It estimates the wage changes "mandated" by changes in prices and TFP, i.e., the wage changes consistent with competitive conditions in the economy. We have a number of findings, but an important result concerning the 1980s was that changes in prices were the major force behind the rise in inequality in the 1980s, not TFP. This result differs from other papers which have not looked at the sector bias of prices and technical change in line with HO underlying theory.
Our results still leave a number of questions unanswered that may provide the basis for future work. First, we have found only a weak link between domestic price changes and international price changes. Without better measures of trade barriers, the extent to which we can ascribe changes in domestic prices as due to some aspect of international trade is still an open question. Second, although our model explains skilled wage changes quite well, we tend to underpredict wage increases of less-skilled workers. This suggests that we need to account better for labour-market institutions and/or the role of supply changes. (3) and (4) an re-estimating gives very similar answers to those reported in table 5.
Data Appendix
Measurement of technology and prices
Data from Oulton and O'Mahony (1994)
V m is the share of intermediate inputs in nominal gross output. N s and N u are "administrative, technical and clerical workers" (skilled) and "others", i.e. operatives (unskilled). This corresponds roughly to the US nonproduction/production split. V s and V u are the shares in gross nominal output of each labour group, calculated using the economy-wide skilled and unskilled wage (defined as the cross-sectional average skilled and unskilled wage) times I divided by PY. All shares are average shares by industry over the decade. V k is calculated as (1-V s -V u -V m ) in order that the shares add up to one. To be consistent, K is calculated as V k *(PY)/p k where p k is the capital price deflator from OO. We drop industries from the OO data set outside of manufacturing and those publicly owned for some or all of the period [SIC code and industry: 370 (Shipbuilding), 381 (Motor vehicles), 383 (Aerospace) and 311 (Iron & Steel)]. We do not use OO's TFP data but construct our own for consistency using the formula above; the correlation between the two measures is 0.95.
Other Data
CONC is the five firm concentration ratio, from the Census of Production, various issues. It is multiplied by 1 minus the import penetration ratio (imports/(sales+imports-exports)) with these data from the Census of Production Quarterly Reports. Industries with penetration ratios above 1 were dropped. These are all 3 digit data.
UNION is a two digit measure of union density constructed originally by Bain and Price and updated by Small (1994) .
INNOV is a count of significant innovations produced in the sector i, from a survey conducted by the Science Policy Research Unit , for further details see Robson and Townsend (1984) and Geroski et al, (1993) . Steve Machin kindly supplied these data. The data was converted to a two digit measure. Foreign price data are unit value indices of goods supplied to domestic industries by country of origin. These data are on the ISIC basis but there is no official conversion method to UK 1968 SIC basis (which is the OO data). We therefore converted these data to a 2 digit 1968 basis by using the official link to the 1980 UK SIC and then linking the 2 digit 1980 UK SIC to the 2 digit 1968 SIC. We are very grateful to Bob Anderton of the National Institute for kindly supplying us with these data. ∆COMPUTER is the change in industry computer intensity derived from a PSI stratified survey of the percentage of establishments replying yes to the question "are you at present using the new microelectronics technology in your production process?" PSI publish average use for 10 industries, averaging over sampled establishments, and 1980s difference is computed using changes 1982-87. See Haskel and Heden (1998) for details.
